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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
vs. 
JOSEPH FINANO MOYA, 
Defendant/Appellant 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant/Appellant Joseph Finano Moya relies on his 
opening brief and also refers this Court to that brief for the 
statements of jurisdiction, the issues, the case, and the facts. 
Appellant Moya responds to the State's answer to his opening brief 
as follows. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant Joseph Moya and the State both agree that the 
trial court should not have revoked Appellant's probation. The 
remedy sought by the two parties is different. Appellant Moya 
requests this Court to enter an order of reversal and an order 
terminating Utah's custody over him. The State requests this Court 
to order the reversal and then, over six years after the date of his 
conviction and sentence, impose a period of probation upon him. 
Just as established caselaw prohibits a court from indefinitely 
suspending the time period for initiating a probation revocation 
action, Appellant requests this Court to prohibit courts from 
indefinitely suspending the time period for imposing probation. 
Probation should not be imposed. 
Case No. 890608-CA 




THE POINTS ARGUED BY APPELLANT IN HIS 
OPENING BRIEF ALSO APPLY TO THE INDEFINITE 
SUSPENSION OF A PROBATIONARY TERM 
(Reply to Point I of Appellee's Brief) 
The State alleges that "Points I, II and IV of 
defendant's [Joseph Moya] appellate brief address issues pertinent 
only to the running of a probation term." Appellee's brief at 5. 
According to the State, the aforementioned points were rendered moot 
by the trial court's correction of a clerical error.1 Appellee's 
brief at 6. The State misinterprets the scope and application of 
the arguments initially presented by Appellant Moya. As explained 
below in Point II of Appellant Moya's reply brief, see infra at 3-9, 
the arguments presented in Points I, II and IV of his opening brief 
apply, in principle, to arguments stated herein against the 
indefinite suspension of a probationary term. 
1
 Appellant Moya is appealing the trial court's 
correction of the "clerical" error. See State v. Moya, District 
Court Case No. CR84-892; Court of Appeals Case No. 900445-CA 
(Docketing Statement, dated August 30, 1990). Consequently, the 
Points argued in Appellant's opening brief may still have a direct 
bearing on the case at bar. In the event the trial court's 
correction of the "clerical" error is affirmed on appeal, the 
arguments presented by Appellant will assume that the probationary 
term was stayed. 
Regardless of whether Appellant Moya's probation had been 
imposed or suspended, the trial court clearly erred by "revoking 
Appellant's probation" and reinstating his prison sentence. If 
probation had been imposed, it would have terminated by operation of 
law eighteen months after the date of sentencing. State v. Green, 
757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988). If probation had been stayed, the court 
-[cont'd on next page]-
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POINT II 
T H E T R I A L C Q U R T C A N N Q T INDEFINITELY 
SUSPEND THE IMPOSITION OF PROBATION 
In its brief, the si.;*- .010*5 ' ""irio the *> .-t 
.0,1^^, ieitriuai. , v: ,1 <.-
granted probation pursuant tu the cour f: Jtiqma 
__*;, . ..j^*_* ant: Mo^a . viidi , ^ u penuAhM u«c lebUiuiiuL T matters 
*~ Mexiiv : * *» t jrisdict-nn n v o 
Appel I a "rut v 
extradition piu^ccaiiiMh dftei Uu New Mexico proceed!nqs had been 
I I cont'd J cuuld not have revoked something which had 
never imposed, Moreover, Appellant could not have violated a 
condition - obation until the probationary term became 
effective. Hence, the order to show cause hearing and the court's 
decision to "revoke" probation, under any circumstance, - ; 
erroneous. 
'bin ,ior either lorm of error, .Joseph Moya has been, 
improperly cominitted to serve "time" in the Salt Lake County Ja :i 1 or 
the Utah State Prison since on or before November 10, 1988, the date 
of the order to show cause hearing for "revoking his probation." On 
February 13, 1990, the Board of Pardons "paroled" Joseph Moya after 
he had already served time in prison for a sentence which the court 
should not have reinstated. See Appellant's reply brief, Point II. 
Despite these unlawful periods of confinement, the State implicitly 
requests that this Court ignore the punishment previously an<i 
improperly imposed. According to the State, Joseph Moya should 
receive the full probationary term and its accompanying conditions, 
but only "in the event that defendant [Moya] returns to Utah." 
Appellee's brief at 10. On November 14, 1991, Appellant Moya's 
period of "parole" will expire. If Appellant "returns to Utah" 
after November 14, 1991, it would defy reason to then reinstate a 
period of "probation" after he had already served his period of 
"parole." The likelihood of this absurd result is a further reason 
m I litating against indefinite suspensions of probata on. 
completed. See Appellant's opening brief, Point III & IV.B. For 
this appeal, it is important to distinguish between the actions 
initially taken by the court and the inactions subsequently allowed 
by the court. The court's "original order" stated, inter alia: 
Defendant is granted a stay of the sentence and 
placed on probation in the custody of this Court 
under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State 
Department of Adult Parole for a period of 18 
months, said conditions of probation to be stayed 
until defendant [Moya] is returned from New Mexico. 
See Addendum B. 
Noteworthy here is what the court order did not express. 
The court ruling did not state, "probation to be stayed until 
defendant returns from New Mexico." Rather, the court stayed the 
imposition of probation "until defendant is returned from New 
Mexico." Addendum B. The State of Utah, however, did nothing to 
procure his return. See Appellant's opening brief, Point III & 
IV.B. 
Moreover, if, as the State contends, "Defendant [Moya] 
was released, not 'on his own recognizance,' . . . but to New Mexico 
authorities who extradited him to that state[,]" Appellee's 
brief at 9, Joseph Moya could not have been expected to return to 
Utah on his own after the resolution of the New Mexico proceedings. 
Indeed, AP&P could have extradited Moya back to Utah but it 
explicitly chose to do otherwise. In an incident report dated April 
17, 1985, AP&P wrote: 
Defendant [Moya] was released from the Salt Lake 
County Jail on October 3, 1984, to the custody of 
New Mexico authorities. He has remained in their 
custody, in Rio Arriba County, and it appears now 
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that the charges in Albuquerque, New Mexd c o, * « !l1 ' 
not be continued, due to prosecutorial problem 
This agency il il^ pf does not feel that it wou^..
 =^ ._ 
advisable to extradite defendant back to Utah, but 
we would request that a domestic warrant be issued 
to arrest defendant in the event he decides to 
return to Utah, 
(R ?!) (einphi^^F idded^ : see 5 
recommenadiiw. ^ -. ;. ^v. ic LI.JL.II * u. -ju^ui^a Appei , ir^ 'f 
freedom outsi }- • L- :- -t lit ah for an md^t inite period c* ^ir*e. 
(R 2 \ I ' 1 
warrant iuwj.,,,!.. . .- freedom by < -ig tne possiDii/ 
"capture" •* extradit m n h*. > 4 ^u^** authorities. ce A~- Giant's 
I.H' conresrc-, :-ue goes be,-1 .J the court's initial 
decision to ^ - n^ » * ' !?r+ * * , .^w^+-1-,r 
1
 • • L. - -, *ssue ^
 h ^ « 
aadresses the- court's subsequent decision < - ;spend indefinitely 
josepn -«w.*. j ^. ^c^-iu to Utah. 
Since the State's argument assumed *hat i-hp 'TI1'-* 
* "knovl edaec* 
- - • - .'JUio -. - - -iiee's br:el at its 
i nterpretatit: .1 in re Flint - * * ] Q P « * * 
snoulw ut- i.ecu uie inactLot-h aproned b\ jourt after 
''**- N*-* Mexico charo<> iad bee^ H i r w ;r''i. 
forgery efcruary 2^  * jourt jurecu : 
defendant to appear for sentencing on March 5, 1902. id. After one 
continuance, the court issued the following order on March 12, 1902: 
"The defendant having been convicted of the crime of forgery, and 
being now before the court to receive sentence, and the court being 
sufficiently advised, it is ordered that sentence be, and the same 
is hereby, suspended, and the defendant permitted to go upon his own 
recognizance." Id. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court found that "[t]he 
defendant, by this order, was, in effect, discharged from custody." 
Id. The question on appeal was, "did the [trial] court, by 
indefinitely suspending sentence, lose jurisdiction of the . . . 
defendant, or did it still retain jurisdiction, with legal power and 
authority to sentence him to the state prison 11 months after he had 
been discharged from custody?" Flint, 71 P. 531. The answer for 
both defendant Flint and Appellant Moya must be the same: 
[The Utah Supreme Court knows] of no rule or 
principle of law whereby a court can indefinitely 
suspend sentence, keep the defendant in a state of 
suspense and uncertainty, and, long after he has 
been discharged from custody, have him rearrested, 
and impose a sentence of either fine or imprisonment 
on him. A suspension of sentence for an indefinite 
period is, in effect, an exercise of the functions 
of the pardoning power, which belongs exclusively to 
the board of pardons. . . When the court suspended 
judgment indefinitely, and ordered the defendant 
discharged from custody, it no longer had 
jurisdiction over him, and all subsequent 
proceedings in the premises were unauthorized by 
law, and are therefore void. 
71 P. at 531-32. 
The State attempted to distinguish these principles by 
arguing that in Flint, "imposition of judgment and sentence was 
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s u s p e n d e d 1 1 and d e f e n d a n t F l i n t was r e l e a s e d " ' n, h i s ivi n, 
i poor jn i fii-iin " i" i "ii'iipe I 1 < H » s I i i < II m i III • III! IIIIIII I l i i || res cut case*, tl: le 
S t a t e c o n t e n d e d , nnlnnittnt was e n t e r e d and s e n t e n c e was imposed b u t 
s u s p e n d e d i n i avo r of t UP i m p o n i t i o n of p r o b a t a on , t h e e x e c u t i DI: i ::: -f 
\ i I ' l l in i ' I I I . . . nii'i s t a y e d puiid iinj Ll.e r e s o l u t i o n * c h a r g e s pend :i i 1 :j 
a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t ( l o y a l IIIIIII Hew M e x i c o . " A p p e l l e e " - or Lef a t 9 . 
T h e S t a t e a I n n nub mi t t >il j - I I .M J I »SP) HI INHI',' • - nad n n i ' . 
own r e c o g n i z a i i M ' 
Whether " t h e •*: - o: i, ;7iM*nt and sentenr** *fas 
suspend 
,iit. p r i n c i p l e s ai-; .JI» • » \* *:.>\ ir " ^ t l ; S I T M * VHS, 
t h e d e f e n d a n t i s kept * s t a t e of suspense . «*^ u i i ce r t axn t^" ' i c r 
• 
In both situations, the courI r initial actions were 
proper The-* court in Flint li.i mini rnnvdcted defendant Flint 
n t mi mi mi n ml I n 1 i mi in i i iiii mi mi in i 11 in u i i / o i i . 1 h i | i J mi n i mi in M e n u mi mi mi i *0*I. The court 
IIIIIII I In c a s e a t b a r , h a v i n g c o n v i c t e d J o s e p h Nfoya, s t a y e d t h e 
i m p o s i t i o n of h i s p r o b a t i o n unt . i l IK1 "IIII IIII I IIII IIIIIPIJ fin MI ll< Mi K 11 u " 
Addend. 
And 11 in 1 m i lii s i I ua t i o n s , t h e c o u r t s ' s j b s e q u e n t o r d e r , " i n 
of f e e t d i s c h a r g e d | thi ' rlefend . ,,,,„ " 1  I 
* c o u r t
 A * * F l i n t ., I.«;. 41 d i IU L have -nde f11 > * L ^ i ^ su spended 
d e f e n d a n t F l * ^ : ' - s e n t e n c e i- . v i t t e d ^ ^ 
r e c o a n i 
AP/jtr - iecomineiiUdtjoni * «oreg. - ^ r a a i t o r j. o c e e d i n g s , ^n t ~D 
r e p l a c e *i ^a t ^Gi i a l ^ci^w* wa i i ahL wxuii a l u u a i -jjomes" -•" - i* 
The State of Utah knew where Joseph Moya could be found and 
still allowed him to remain there without seeking to impose 
probation. Utah did not request his return, by extradition or 
otherwise, nor did it attempt to maintain supervision over him. Cf. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-24 (1989) ("Out-of-state supervision of 
probationers and parolees"). Given these circumstances, the court's 
approval of AP&P's recommendation effectively discharged Appellant 
Moya from custody. Cf. In re Flint, 71 P. 532 ("when a defendant 
stands convicted, . . . it is the duty of the court to keep control 
of the case . . . . " ) . Moreover, even if Appellant's indefinite 
grant of freedom outside the State of Utah was threatened "in the 
event he decide[d] to return to Utah," he still could live in Utah 
"on his own recognizance" as long as he remained "free" of a 
warrant's check. 
As recognized by the Court in State v. Gr€>en, 757 P.2d 462 
(Utah 1988), the analogous principles of Flint defeated arguments 
for an indefinite tolling of the probationary period. Just as the 
Green Court unanimously rejected the State's position "that there 
[was] no time limit for initiating a [probation] revocation 
actionf,]" id. at 464, Appellant Moya requests this Court to reject 
the State's position that there is no time limit for imposing 
probation. The two concepts are one and the same in theory and 
application. Probation should not be indefinitely tolled nor should 
it be indefinitely suspended. Decades could pass before probation 
was either revoked or imposed. Defendants subject to either 
scenario "would be left in a perpetual state of limbo[,] " 
-8 -
especially where, as here, the court was aware of the defendant's 
whereabouts though it still did nothing to retrieve him. See 
Appellant's opening brief, Points I, II, III, IV.B. 
Both parties agree that the trial court's revocation of 
Appellant Moya's probation was improper. Joseph Moya "requests this 
Court to reverse the lower court's decision and remand this case for 
the entry of an order terminating Utah's custody over Appellant." 
Appellant's opening brief at 24. The State requests that Appellant 
Moya's "probation revocation should be reversed and the matter 
remanded to the trial court for the execution of probation . . . 
[I]n the event that defendant returns to Utah, probation should be 
executed as originally ordered." Appellee's brief at 9-10. 
What the State is asking for now is what AP&P had asked for 
before. The request of both parties, if approved by this Court, 
suspends indefinitely the time period for imposing probation. The 
State's request should be denied. See also Appellant's reply brief 
at 2-3 n.l. 
-9 -
CONCLUSION 
Appellant Moya respectfully requests this Court to reverse 
the lower court's decision and remand this case for the entry of an 
order terminating Utah's custody over Appellant. 
Respectfully submitted this day d>f September, 1990. 
Rona{Ld S. Fujiho 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, RONALD S. FUJINO, hereby certify that eight copies of 
the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400 
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and 
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 23 6 State Capitol, 




day of September, 1990. 
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ADDENDUM A 
77-27-24. Out-of-state supervision of probationers and pa-
rolees — Compact. 
The governor of this state is authorized to execute a compact on behalf of 
the State of Utah with any other state legally joining therein. "State," as used 
in this section, includes any state, territory or possession of the United States 
and the District of Columbia. The compact shall be in the form substantially 
as follows: 
A compact entered into by and among the contracting states, signatories 
thereto, with the consent of the Congress of the United States of America, 
granted by an act entitled An Act Granting the Consent of Congress to any 
two or more States to enter into Agreements or Compacts for cooperative 
effort and mutual assistance in the prevention of crime and for other purposes. 
The contracting states solemnly agree: 
Form of Compact. 
(a) That it shall be competent for the duly constituted judicial and 
administrative authorities of a state party to this compact (herein called 
sending state) to permit any person convicted of an offense within such 
state and placed on probation or released on parole to reside in any other 
state party to this compact (herein called receiving state) while on proba-
tion or parole, if 
(1) Such person is in fact a resident of or has his family residing 
within the receiving state and can obtain employment there. 
(2) Though not a resident of the receiving state and not having his 
family residing there, the receiving state consents to such person 
being sent there. 
Before granting such permission, opportunity shall be granted to the receiv-
ing state to investigate the home and prospective employment of such person. 
630 
PARDONS AND PAROLES / l~JLi-&<± 
A resident of the receiving state, within the meaning of this section, is one 
who has been an actual inhabitant of such state continuously for more than 
one year prior to his coming to the sending state and has not resided within 
the sending state more than six continuous months immediately preceding 
the commission of the offense for which he has been convicted. 
Receiving State to Supervise Probationers or Parolees. 
(b) That each receiving state will assume the duties of visitation of and 
supervision over probationers or parolees of any sending state and in the 
exercise of those duties will be governed by the same standards that 
prevail for its own probationers and parolees. 
Extraditions Procedure Waived, When. 
(c) That duly accredited officers of a sending state may at all times 
enter a receiving state and there apprehend and retake any person on 
probation or parole from such sending state. For that purpose no formali-
ties will be required other than establishing the authority of the officer 
and the identity of the person to be retaken. All legal requirements to 
obtain extradition of fugitives from justice are expressly waived on the 
part of states party hereto as to such persons. The decision of the sending 
state to retake a person on probation (or parole) shall be conclusive upon 
and not reviewable within the receiving state; provided if at the time 
when a state seeks to retake a probationer or parolee there should be 
pending against him within the receiving state any criminal charge, or he 
should be suspected of having committed within such state a criminal 
offense, he shall not be retaken without the consent of the receiving state 
until discharged from prosecution or from imprisonment for such offense. 
Transporting Prisoners. 
(d) That the duly accredited officers of the sending state will be permit-
ted to transport prisoners being retaken through any and all states par-
ties to this compact without interference. 
Rules and Regulations. 
(e) That the governor of each state may designate an officer who, act-
ing jointly with like officers of other contracting states, if and when ap-
pointed, shall promulgate such rules and regulations as may be deemed 
necessary to more effectively carry out the terms of this compact. 
Execution of Compact — Effect. 
(f) That this compact shall become operative immediately upon its exe-
cution by any state as between it and any other state or states so execut-
ing. When executed it shall have the full force and effect of law within 
such state, the form of execution to be in accordance with the laws of the 
executing state. 
Renunciation of Compact. 
(g) That this compact shall continue in force and remain binding upon 
each executing state until renounced by it. That duties and obligations 
hereunder of a renouncing state shall continue as to parolees or proba-
tioners residing therein at the time of withdrawal until retaken or finally 
discharged by the sending state. Renunciation of this compact shall be by 
the same authority which executed it, on sending six months' notice in 




R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
JUDITH S.H. ATHERTON (3982) 
Assistant Attorney General. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1022 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : ORDER 
v. : 
Case No. 841908921 
JOSEPH FINANO MOYA, : 
judge Scott Daniels 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
Based on plaintiff's motion for correction of clerical 
error, hearing on the motion and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Judgment, Sentence and Commitment 
to the Utah State Prison dated September 13, 1984, is corrected 
nunc pro tunc to read as follows: 
Defendant is granted a stay of the 
sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court under the supervision 
of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of 
Adult Parole for a period of 18 months, said 
conditions of probation to be stayed until 
defendant is returned from New Mexico. 
By 
f u — » • - ' • • • • - • - • • • • • 
Third Juciclui ^ : - ^ i 
JUL 2 6 1SS0 
j/tfyuppl. . ,. 
Defendant i s ordered t o pay r e s t i t u t i o n 
i n the amount of $700.00. 
Defendant is to enter, participate, and 
complete any alcohol rehabilitation program 
directed by the Department of Adult Probation 
and Parole. 
DATED this J^> day of July, 1990. 
BY THE COURT 
ai HQA 
HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS 
Third District Court Judge 
Approved as to Form: 
R O N ^ 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Order was mailed/ postage prepaid, to Ronald Fujino, 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, 





DATE: April 17, 1985 
NAME: MOYA, Joseph Finano, aka PADILLA COURT CASE NO.: CR 84-892 
COURT: Third Judicial District JUDGE: Scott Daniels 
DATE RECEIVED ON PROBATION: September 13, 1984 OFFENSE: Burglary, Fel III0 
ADDRESS: Rio Arriba Co Jail, Espanola, N M EMPLOYMENT: 
COMMENTS: 
Reference our incident report of January 9, 1985, and the Pre-Sentence 
Report of September 7, 1984. 
Defendant was released from the Salt Lake County Jail on October 3, 
1984, to the custody of New Mexico authorities. He has remained in their 
custody, in Rio Arriba County, and it appears now that the charges in 
Albuquerque, New Mexico, will not be continued, due to prosecutorial problems. 
This agency does not feel that it would be adviseable to extradite 
defendant back to Utah, but we would request that a "Domestic" warrant be . r\ 
issued to arrest defendant in the event he decides to return to. Utah ..//\ // 




IMMEDIATE ACTION TAKEN BY AGENT: Obtained data, informed Supervisor and Court. 
RECOMMENDATION: Request that N C I C, No Bail warrant of January 14, 1985, be 
recalled, and that a "Domestic" warrant, with bail of $25,000.00 be issued. 
EUGENE F. P R E S S E T T S U P E R V M /JOHN W. MC NEILL DISTRICT AGENT 
NOTET^This form i s used to report rule infractions to the Court. 
Original stays in f i l e 
Signed copy to Court 
Other copies"as needed 
AP5P/26 11/80 
onor.23 
